2025, the Year of the Major Peace Betrayals by D. Conterno

2025, the Year of the Major Peace Betrayals by D. Conterno (2026)

 


 

Abstract

This essay argues that 2025’s defining geopolitical pattern was not simply the persistence of war, but the repeated performance of peace alongside actions that predictably prolonged violence: ceasefires announced without credible enforcement, negotiations that generated headlines but not stability, humanitarian commitments not matched by access, and a wider political economy drifting towards militarisation. I define “peace betrayal” as the observable gap between de-escalation claims and de-escalation outcomes. There are simply too many conflicts that could be referred in this article, however the task of creating an exhaustive list of every conflict and every misleading claim worldwide is simply too enormous. Therefore, I have only used documented, illustrative 2025 episodes across South Asia, Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, and Myanmar, supported by institutional datasets (UNHCR, SIPRI, and the Global Peace Index). The Nobel Peace Prize controversy is analysed as a symbolic case: “peace” became a tradable reputational asset in public discourse, even as Nobel institutions reiterated that the prize cannot be transferred or shared.

Keywords: ceasefire credibility; humanitarian access; institutional legitimacy; militarisation; displacement; peace processes

 

1. Introduction: defining “peace betrayal” without poetry

In 2025, “peace” was frequently presented as an imminent deliverable: “progress”, “breakthroughs”, “roadmaps”, “special sessions”, “expanded missions”, and “historic proposals”. The betrayal, in this essay’s operational sense, is not metaphysical. It is measurable: public claims of de-escalation repeatedly coexisted with actions and outcomes that entrenched escalation.

I use “betrayal” ironically because the word is often reserved for dramatic moral tales. Here it describes a mundane bureaucratic pattern: peace is invoked as branding while the conditions for peace are not built.

 

2. The baseline: 2025’s measurable drift away from peace

Three widely cited indicators frame 2025’s environment:

  • Forced displacement: UNHCR estimated 117.3 million people forcibly displaced worldwide at end-June 2025 (UNHCR, 2025a, 2025b).
  • Militarisation: SIPRI reported world military expenditure of $2,718 billion in 2024, a 9.4% real-terms increase from 2023 and the steepest year-on-year rise since at least 1988 (SIPRI, 2025a, 2025b).
  • Global peacefulness: the Global Peace Index 2025 reported a continued decline in global peacefulness and highlighted elevated risk factors that precede major conflict (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2025).

These are not interpretations. They are the structural floor beneath 2025’s diplomacy.

 

3. Case snapshots: peace claims that did not survive contact with events

3.1 South Asia: ceasefire announced, then disputed within hours

Reuters reported that India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on 10 May 2025, but that explosions and accusations of violations followed within hours (Reuters, 2025a). The irony is not in the attempt to stop fighting; it is in how quickly “ceasefire” became a contested word rather than an enforced condition.

3.2 Eastern DRC: “ceasefire” as manoeuvre

Reuters reported that M23 rebels captured Nyabibwe on 5 February 2025 despite a unilateral ceasefire declaration, according to multiple sources cited by Reuters (Reuters, 2025b). When ceasefires are announced without credible monitoring and consequences, they can function as tactical pauses rather than stabilising commitments.

3.3 Gaza: “progress” and “breakthrough” as a recurring diplomatic weather forecast

Reuters reported:
a. Cairo round ending with no breakthrough on 14 April 2025 (Reuters, 2025c)
b. “Some progress” described by Qatar’s Prime Minister on 27 April 2025 (Reuters, 2025d)
c. Claims of a “significant breakthrough” on 28 April 2025 attributed to Egyptian security sources (Reuters, 2025e).

The pattern is verifiable: optimism is repeatedly signalled, then repeatedly deferred.

The betrayal mechanism is the substitution of negotiation signals for measurable de-escalation.

3.4 Ukraine: peace plans as instruments of leverage

Reuters published the draft text of a U.S.-backed Ukraine peace proposal on 21 November 2025 (Reuters, 2025f) and the full text of a European counter-proposal on 23 November 2025 (Reuters, 2025g).

The existence of proposals is important. It is not, by itself, evidence that peace conditions were secured. In 2025, “peace plan publication” often served as a political event in its own right.

3.5 Sudan (El Fasher): institutional urgency after the catastrophe timetable

Reuters reported that the UN Human Rights Council held an emergency session on 14 November 2025 concerning alleged atrocities in and around El Fasher (Reuters, 2025h). OHCHR’s meeting summary states that the Council adopted a resolution requesting an urgent inquiry into alleged violations committed in and around El Fasher (OHCHR, 2025b).
The bitter irony is institutional: the strongest language often arrives once mass violence is already documented.

3.6 Haiti: the slow-motion collapse that diplomacy treats as background

Reuters reported that nearly 5,000 people had been killed in Haiti since October 2024 (citing an OHCHR report) and that fewer than 25% of health facilities near Port-au-Prince were functional (Reuters, 2025i). OHCHR separately reported that 5,601 people were killed in Haiti in 2024 due to gang violence (OHCHR, 2025a).
Later, Reuters reported that the UN Security Council approved a larger force for Haiti on 30 September 2025 (Reuters, 2025j). The betrayal mechanism here is not that action was taken, but that action remained structurally late, under-resourced, and debated while violence and displacement continued.

3.7 Myanmar: humanitarian need normalised as an annual planning cycle

UN Myanmar’s Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan material for 2025 states that 19.9 million people were estimated to need humanitarian assistance (United Nations in Myanmar, 2024). OCHA’s Global Humanitarian Overview 2025 entry similarly states that 19.9 million people would require aid in 2025 (OCHA, 2024).

The betrayal mechanism is normalisation: suffering becomes an administratively managed constant rather than a politically unacceptable emergency.

 

4. A typology of 2025’s “peace betrayal” mechanisms

Across these cases, 2025 repeatedly displayed a small set of mechanisms:

  1. Ceasefire-as-theatre: announcements without enforceability, followed by immediate contestation or battlefield movement (Reuters, 2025a, 2025b).
  2. Negotiation-as-optics: “progress” signals substituting for verifiable stabilisation (Reuters, 2025c–2025e).
  3. Law-and-inquiry after escalation: accountability language intensifies once atrocities are already reported (Reuters, 2025h; OHCHR, 2025b).
  4. Chronic crisis triage: some collapses are treated as background, even when death tolls and displacement are extreme (OHCHR, 2025a; Reuters, 2025i–2025j).
  5. Humanitarianism without adequate access or security: needs are documented at scale while violence persists (OCHA, 2024; United Nations in Myanmar, 2024).
  6. Militarisation as macro-default: rising global expenditure shapes political imagination towards coercive capacity (SIPRI, 2025a, 2025b).

Mechanism 7 follows as a symbolic overlay: peace institutions themselves become contested.

 

5. The Nobel Peace Prize in 2025: when peace becomes a trad-able token (it does not)

5.1 The verifiable facts

NobelPrize.org states that the Nobel Peace Prize 2025 was awarded to María Corina Machado “for her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy” (Nobel Prize Outreach AB, 2025).

Nota Bene: In January 2026, the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize site published a statement reiterating that once a Nobel Prize is announced, it cannot be revoked, shared, or transferred (Norwegian Nobel Institute, 2026). Sorry, Donald Trump!

5.2 How it was challenged

The “challenge” was not a court proceeding against the Nobel Committee; it was a legitimacy dispute in public discourse about whether a peace award was being pulled into coercive geopolitics. For example, The Guardian reported that critics pointed to Machado’s past support for international intervention as part of the controversy around the award (The Guardian, 2025a; The Guardian, 2025b).

Important caution: From the sources above, I can confirm that critics made these arguments. I cannot confirm that the laureate “supports violence” as a settled fact. The contestation is the point: 2025’s peace symbolism became another arena where conflict-aligned narratives fought over the definition of “peace”.

5.3 Why it belongs in this essay

In an already militarised global atmosphere (SIPRI, 2025a), the Peace Prize became a reputational asset that political actors treated as transferable property in public conversation, requiring Nobel institutions to restate basic rules (Norwegian Nobel Institute, 2026). That is an unusually clean example of symbolic “peace” being absorbed into power politics.

 

6. Conclusion: peace rhetoric expanded; peace conditions did not

UNHCR’s displacement statistics, SIPRI’s expenditure trend, and the Global Peace Index’s decline describe a world in 2025 that was structurally less peaceful (UNHCR, 2025a; SIPRI, 2025a; Institute for Economics & Peace, 2025). Against that baseline, 2025’s “peace betrayal” was the systematic replacement of peace architecture (monitoring, accountability, civilian protection, enforceable access, credible incentives) with peace messaging.

The year did not prove that peace is impossible. It proved that peace is often treated as a communications layer placed on top of escalation dynamics. In 2025, that layer became thick.

 

References

Institute for Economics & Peace. (2025). Global Peace Index 2025. Vision of Humanity. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Global-Peace-Index-2025-web.pdf

Norwegian Nobel Institute. (2026, January 9). A Nobel Prize cannot be revoked, shared, or transferred. https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/press/press-releases/a-nobel-prize-cannot-be-revoked-shared-or-transferred

Nobel Prize Outreach AB. (2025). The Nobel Peace Prize 2025 (summary page). NobelPrize.org. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2025/summary/

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2025a, January 7). Haiti: Over 5600 killed in gang violence in 2024, UN figures show. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/haiti-over-5600-killed-gang-violence-2024-un-figures-show

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2025b, November 14). Human Rights Council calls for urgent inquiry into recent alleged violations of international law committed in and around El Fasher, Sudan (Meeting summary). https://www.ohchr.org/en/meeting-summaries/2025/11/human-rights-council-calls-urgent-inquiry-recent-alleged-violations

Office of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2024). Global Humanitarian Overview 2025: Myanmar. https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2025/article/myanmar-2

Reuters. (2025a, May 10). India and Pakistan exchange fire despite ceasefire agreement. https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-pakistan-exchange-fire-despite-ceasefire-agreement-2025-05-10/

Reuters. (2025b, February 5). Rebels in Congo capture town despite ceasefire, sources say. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-congo-capture-town-despite-ceasefire-sources-say-2025-02-05/

Reuters. (2025c, April 14). No breakthrough in Gaza talks, Egyptian and Palestinian sources say. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/no-breakthrough-gaza-talks-egyptian-palestinian-sources-say-2025-04-14/

Reuters. (2025d, April 27). Gaza ceasefire talks make some progress, Qatari PM says. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-ceasefire-talks-make-some-progress-qatari-pm-says-2025-04-27/

Reuters. (2025e, April 28). Gaza ceasefire talks in Cairo near “significant breakthrough”, sources say. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/negotiations-over-gaza-ceasefire-cairo-witnessing-significant-breakthrough-two-2025-04-28/

Reuters. (2025f, November 21). Draft of US-backed peace proposal for Ukraine. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/draft-us-backed-peace-proposal-ukraine-2025-11-21/

Reuters. (2025g, November 23). Full text of European counter-proposal to US Ukraine peace plan. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/full-text-european-counter-proposal-us-ukraine-peace-plan-2025-11-23/

Reuters. (2025h, November 14). UN human rights council begins emergency session on Sudan. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/un-human-rights-council-begins-emergency-session-sudan-2025-11-14/

Reuters. (2025i, July 11). Haiti gang violence claims 5,000 lives in less than a year, UN report. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-gang-violence-claims-5000-lives-less-than-year-un-report-2025-07-11/

Reuters. (2025j, September 30). UN Security Council approves bigger force in Haiti to tackle gangs. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-security-council-approves-bigger-force-haiti-tackle-gangs-2025-09-30/

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2025a, April 28). Trends in world military expenditure, 2024 (SIPRI Fact Sheet). https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2025b, April 28). Unprecedented rise in global military expenditure as European and Middle East spending surges (Press release). https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges

The Guardian. (2025a, October 10). Venezuelan politician María Corina Machado wins Nobel peace prize. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/10/venezuelan-politician-maria-corina-machado-wins-nobel-peace-prize

The Guardian. (2025b, December 10). Venezuelan Nobel peace prize winner misses ceremony … https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/10/venezuelan-nobel-peace-prize-winner-maria-corina-machado-not-attend-ceremony-oslo

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2025a, November 4). Mid-Year Trends Report 2025. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/mid-year-trends-report-2025.pdf

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2025b, November 4). Figures at a glance (forcibly displaced at end-June 2025). https://www.unhcr.org/uk/about-unhcr/overview/figures-glance

United Nations in Myanmar. (2024, December). Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025 (overview page). https://myanmar.un.org/en/286727-myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2025-december-2024

  

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