2025, the Year of the Major Peace Betrayals by D. Conterno
2025, the Year of the Major Peace Betrayals by D. Conterno (2026)
Abstract
This essay argues that 2025’s defining geopolitical pattern
was not simply the persistence of war, but the repeated performance of
peace alongside actions that predictably prolonged violence: ceasefires
announced without credible enforcement, negotiations that generated headlines
but not stability, humanitarian commitments not matched by access, and a wider
political economy drifting towards militarisation. I define “peace betrayal” as
the observable gap between de-escalation claims and de-escalation outcomes. There
are simply too many conflicts that could be referred in this article, however
the task of creating an exhaustive list of every conflict and every misleading
claim worldwide is simply too enormous. Therefore, I have only used documented,
illustrative 2025 episodes across South Asia, Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, and Myanmar, supported by
institutional datasets (UNHCR, SIPRI, and the Global Peace Index). The Nobel
Peace Prize controversy is analysed as a symbolic case: “peace” became a
tradable reputational asset in public discourse, even as Nobel institutions
reiterated that the prize cannot be transferred or shared.
Keywords: ceasefire credibility; humanitarian access;
institutional legitimacy; militarisation; displacement; peace processes
1. Introduction: defining “peace betrayal” without poetry
In 2025, “peace” was frequently presented as an imminent
deliverable: “progress”, “breakthroughs”, “roadmaps”, “special sessions”,
“expanded missions”, and “historic proposals”. The betrayal, in this essay’s
operational sense, is not metaphysical. It is measurable: public claims of
de-escalation repeatedly coexisted with actions and outcomes that entrenched
escalation.
I use “betrayal” ironically because the word is often
reserved for dramatic moral tales. Here it describes a mundane bureaucratic
pattern: peace is invoked as branding while the conditions for peace are not
built.
2. The baseline: 2025’s measurable drift away from peace
Three widely cited indicators frame 2025’s environment:
- Forced
displacement: UNHCR estimated 117.3 million people forcibly
displaced worldwide at end-June 2025 (UNHCR, 2025a, 2025b).
- Militarisation:
SIPRI reported world military expenditure of $2,718 billion in 2024,
a 9.4% real-terms increase from 2023 and the steepest year-on-year
rise since at least 1988 (SIPRI, 2025a, 2025b).
- Global
peacefulness: the Global Peace Index 2025 reported a continued
decline in global peacefulness and highlighted elevated risk factors that
precede major conflict (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2025).
These are not interpretations. They are the structural floor
beneath 2025’s diplomacy.
3. Case snapshots: peace claims that did not survive
contact with events
3.1 South Asia: ceasefire announced, then disputed within
hours
3.2 Eastern DRC: “ceasefire” as manoeuvre
3.3 Gaza: “progress” and “breakthrough” as a recurring
diplomatic weather forecast
3.4 Ukraine: peace plans as instruments of leverage
The existence of proposals is important. It is not, by itself, evidence that peace conditions were secured. In 2025, “peace plan publication” often served as a political event in its own right.
3.5 Sudan (El Fasher): institutional urgency after the
catastrophe timetable
The bitter irony is institutional: the strongest language often arrives once mass violence is already documented.
3.6 Haiti: the slow-motion collapse that diplomacy treats
as background
Later, Reuters reported that the UN Security Council approved a larger force for Haiti on 30 September 2025 (Reuters, 2025j). The betrayal mechanism here is not that action was taken, but that action remained structurally late, under-resourced, and debated while violence and displacement continued.
3.7 Myanmar: humanitarian need normalised as an annual
planning cycle
4. A typology of 2025’s “peace betrayal” mechanisms
Across these cases, 2025 repeatedly displayed a small set of
mechanisms:
- Ceasefire-as-theatre:
announcements without enforceability, followed by immediate contestation
or battlefield movement (Reuters, 2025a, 2025b).
- Negotiation-as-optics:
“progress” signals substituting for verifiable stabilisation (Reuters,
2025c–2025e).
- Law-and-inquiry
after escalation: accountability language intensifies once atrocities
are already reported (Reuters, 2025h; OHCHR, 2025b).
- Chronic
crisis triage: some collapses are treated as background, even when
death tolls and displacement are extreme (OHCHR, 2025a; Reuters,
2025i–2025j).
- Humanitarianism
without adequate access or security: needs are documented at scale
while violence persists (OCHA, 2024; United Nations in Myanmar, 2024).
- Militarisation
as macro-default: rising global expenditure shapes political
imagination towards coercive capacity (SIPRI, 2025a, 2025b).
Mechanism 7 follows as a symbolic overlay: peace
institutions themselves become contested.
5. The Nobel Peace Prize in 2025: when peace becomes a
trad-able token (it does not)
5.1 The verifiable facts
Nota Bene: In January 2026, the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize site published a statement reiterating that once a Nobel Prize is announced, it cannot be revoked, shared, or transferred (Norwegian Nobel Institute, 2026). Sorry, Donald Trump!
5.2 How it was challenged
The “challenge” was not a court proceeding against the Nobel
Committee; it was a legitimacy dispute in public discourse about whether a
peace award was being pulled into coercive geopolitics. For example, The
Guardian reported that critics pointed to Machado’s past support for
international intervention as part of the controversy around the award (The
Guardian, 2025a; The Guardian, 2025b).
Important caution: From the sources above, I can
confirm that critics made these arguments. I cannot confirm that the laureate
“supports violence” as a settled fact. The contestation is the point: 2025’s
peace symbolism became another arena where conflict-aligned narratives fought
over the definition of “peace”.
5.3 Why it belongs in this essay
6. Conclusion: peace rhetoric expanded; peace conditions
did not
UNHCR’s displacement statistics, SIPRI’s expenditure trend,
and the Global Peace Index’s decline describe a world in 2025 that was
structurally less peaceful (UNHCR, 2025a; SIPRI, 2025a; Institute for Economics
& Peace, 2025). Against that baseline, 2025’s “peace betrayal” was the
systematic replacement of peace architecture (monitoring, accountability,
civilian protection, enforceable access, credible incentives) with peace
messaging.
The year did not prove that peace is impossible. It proved
that peace is often treated as a communications layer placed on top of
escalation dynamics. In 2025, that layer became thick.
References
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