Quantifying Humankind’s Survival Probability, 2026 by D. Conterno (2026)
Quantifying Humankind’s Survival Probability, 2026 by D. Conterno (2026)
Executive Summary
This 2026 update revises Conscious
Enterprises Network (CEN)’s 20-year survival assessment in light of intensified
conflict dynamics, including renewed Middle East escalation risk centred on
Iran. After recalibrating the baseline hazard ledger and mitigation levers, CEN
assigns the period 2026-2046 a mid-range survival probability of 30 percent
(uncertainty band: 28-32 percent), representing a further decline from the May
2025 addendum estimate of 37 percent.
The primary drivers of deterioration are
(1) an increased assessed likelihood of major interstate war associated with
the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, and
January 2026 signalling around possible U.S. intervention and Iranian
retaliation threats; and (2) a higher assessed likelihood of AI-enabled
systemic cyber disruption, reflecting post-strike security advisories on
Iran-linked cyber risk. Countervailing positives remain: AI governance
continues to mature in the EU, and the WHO Pandemic Agreement adoption
strengthens preparedness, though enforcement and ratification risks remain.
1 Introduction
This report updates the May 2025 CEN
Survival Probability Assessment by integrating: (a) verified developments from
May 2025 to 11 January 2026; (b) updated climate and emissions reporting for
2024–2025; and (c) major policy and security events bearing on systemic
escalation pathways. Probability values are CEN working estimates derived from
a hybrid methodology described in Appendix A.
2 Global Context Snapshot (January 2026)
2.1 Geopolitical Tension
West Africa: In December 2025, Benin
reportedly faced an attempted coup centred on Camp Togbin. Reuters reported
that Nigeria carried out airstrikes and provided forces at Benin’s request; the
same reporting described France as providing intelligence and logistical
support. No credible reporting was found supporting the specific claim that
France itself conducted bombing of Beninese territory. (Reuters, 2025a;
Reuters, 2025b; International Crisis Group, 2025; Le Monde, 2025).
Nigeria: The United States Africa Command
stated that U.S. forces conducted airstrikes in Nigeria’s north-west (Sokoto
State) on 25 December 2025 against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
elements, at the request of the Nigerian government; Reuters also reported the
strikes. (U.S. Africa Command, 2025; Reuters, 2025c).
Venezuela: Reuters reported that U.S.
forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores,
in a military operation on 3 January 2026 and transferred them to face charges
in New York; Reuters further reported legal experts’ questions regarding the
operation’s consistency with U.S. and international law. (Reuters, 2026b).
Arctic and territorial claims: Reuters
reported President Donald Trump stating that the United States “needs to own”
Greenland, and the Reuters reporting described internal discussions that
included potential military options. (Reuters, 2026c).
Mexico and Latin America: Reuters reported
President Trump confirming that he offered to send U.S. troops into Mexico to
assist in operations against drug cartels, and noted that he had publicly
suggested unilateral U.S. military action if Mexico did not dismantle cartels.
(Reuters, 2025d).
Europe–Russia: Reuters reported that the
European Commission presented proposals intended to mobilise up to €800 billion
over four years to increase European defence readiness, explicitly framed as
deterring potential future attack from Russia; Reuters also reported that the
UK allocated £200 million (about $270 million) to prepare for a possible troop
deployment to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire. (Reuters, 2025e; Reuters,
2026d).
2.1.1 Iran and regional escalation risk (Update: 11
January 2026)
Iran and Israel: Reuters reported that
Israel and Iran fought a 12-day air and missile war in June 2025. Reuters also
reported that U.S. forces struck three Iranian nuclear sites on 21 June 2025
and that, during the conflict, the United States moved additional fighter
aircraft and other defensive capabilities into the region to protect forces and
allies. (Reuters, 2025f; Reuters, 2025g; Reuters, 2025h).
January 2026 signalling: On 11 January
2026, Reuters reported that Israel was on heightened alert over the possibility
of U.S. intervention in Iran amid unrest inside the country. On the same date,
Reuters reported Iranian officials warning that any U.S. attack would trigger
retaliation against U.S. bases in the region and against Israel. (Reuters,
2026e; Reuters, 2026f).
Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean posture:
The United Kingdom maintains Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, including RAF
Akrotiri, which UK defence sources describe as supporting regional crisis
response. The U.S. Air Force has publicly documented assessments of Cyprus’
Andreas Papandreou Air Base for expansion as a staging location, and the
Associated Press reported Cyprus’ government position that any foreign use
requires approval and is not intended for offensive operations. Separately,
Reuters reported that Greece, Israel and Cyprus plan to expand joint air and
naval exercises in 2026. These posture indicators increase operational
optionality, but they do not, by themselves, confirm a decision to launch a
large-scale invasion of Iran. (UK Government, 2025; Royal Air Force, n.d.; U.S.
Air Forces in Europe - Air Forces Africa, 2025; Associated Press, 2025;
Reuters, 2025i).
Cyber and internal-security spillovers:
After the June 2025 strikes, Reuters reported that the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security issued a warning about a heightened threat environment and
cited elevated risks of cyber activity by pro-Iranian or Iran-linked actors.
Separately, CISA, FBI, NSA and DoD DC3 issued a joint public statement on
potential targeted cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure.
(Reuters, 2025j; CISA, FBI, DC3, & NSA, 2025).
2.2 Technological Landscape
EU AI Act: The EU Artificial Intelligence
Act entered into force on 1 August 2024 and has staged application dates. The
European Commission’s ‘Shaping Europe’s Digital Future’ timeline indicates that
prohibited AI practices and AI literacy obligations began to apply from 2
February 2025, while general full applicability is 2 August 2026 (with some
longer transitions). (European Commission, 2024–2025; Regulation (EU)
2024/1689).
2.3 Environmental Front-line
Emissions: The Global Carbon Project
projected fossil CO2 emissions to rise by 0.8 percent in 2024 (Global Carbon
Budget 2024) and by 1.1 percent in 2025 (Global Carbon Budget 2025). The IEA
reported that energy-related CO2 emissions rose by 0.8 percent in 2024,
reaching 37.8 Gt CO2. (Global Carbon Project, 2024, 2025; International Energy
Agency, 2025).
Temperature: The Copernicus Climate Change
Service reported 2024 as the warmest year on record globally and the first year
to exceed 1.5°C above the pre-industrial reference period in its ERA5 dataset;
Copernicus also reported that 2025 was on course to be joint-second warmest
year, and that the three-year average for 2023–2025 was on track to exceed
1.5°C above pre-industrial. (Copernicus Climate Change Service, 2025).
Climate finance: UNFCCC reported that COP29
agreed to triple finance to developing countries to USD 300 billion annually by
2035 and to scale up finance from all sources to USD 1.3 trillion per year by
2035. (UNFCCC, 2024).
2.4 Biological Security
2.5 Societal Fragmentation and Resilience
3 Quantifying Baseline Risks, 2026–2046
Table 1 summarises CEN’s baseline hazard
ledger for the 20-year period 2026–2046.
|
Domain |
Key hazard indicator |
Twenty-year likelihood (mid) |
Severity weight |
Adjusted contribution |
|
Major interstate war |
Great-power confrontation escalates to
broad regional conflict |
33% |
1.0 |
33% |
|
Nuclear weapon use |
Detonation of ≥ 1 warhead (intentional or
accidental) |
11% |
1.0 |
11% |
|
Climate disruption |
Cross-sectoral damage from > 2°C
warming plus tipping cascades |
29% |
1.0 |
29% |
|
Engineered pathogen |
Release causing ≥ 10 million fatalities |
13% |
1.0 |
13% |
|
AI-enabled systemic cyber failure |
Sustained global outage of critical
digital or power infrastructure |
11% |
1.0 |
11% |
|
Space-asset cascade |
Kessler-type debris event cripples
satellite services |
5% |
0.8 |
4% |
|
Combined baseline risk (simple sum) |
|
|
|
101% |
Drivers of change since May 2025: CEN
increases the major-interstate war likelihood by +2 percentage points,
reflecting the June 2025 Israel-Iran air and missile war, the reported U.S.
strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, and renewed January 2026 signalling around
possible U.S. intervention and Iranian retaliation threats. CEN also increases
the AI-systemic cyber-failure likelihood by +1 percentage point because U.S.
security reporting after the June 2025 strikes warned of a heightened cyber
threat environment associated with Iran-linked actors. (Reuters, 2025f-2025j; CISA, FBI, DC3, & NSA,
2025; SIPRI, 2025; Reuters, 2026e-2026f).
4 Technological and Societal Mitigations
Table 2 summarises mitigation levers and
offsets used in the 2026 calculation.
|
Lever |
Positive impact (20y) |
Negative offset (20y) |
Remarks |
|
Beneficial AI (climate modelling, drug
discovery, energy optimisation) |
+23% |
— |
Expanded application, but uneven access
and governance. |
|
AI governance (EU AI Act staged
application; emerging global norms) |
+12% |
— |
Prohibited practices apply from 2 Feb
2025; further obligations phase in to 2026–2027. |
|
Global health innovation and preparedness |
+9% |
— |
WHO Pandemic Agreement adopted 20 May
2025; implementation and signature/ratification remain variable. |
|
Climate finance and adaptation (COP29
outcomes; resilience investment) |
+14% |
— |
UNFCCC reports goal of USD 300bn annually
to developing countries by 2035 and scaling to USD 1.3tn per year from all
sources. |
|
Social cohesion initiatives (dialogue
platforms; inclusive-growth programmes) |
+10% |
-17% |
CEN net effect reflects growth of
initiatives offset by rising grievance and polarisation. |
|
AI misuse and autonomy (deepfakes;
autonomous weapons; self-learning malware) |
— |
-20% |
Rapid diffusion of generative
capabilities and proliferation to malicious actors. |
|
Totals |
+68% |
-37% |
Net mitigation effect: +31% |
Key notes on evidence base: The EU AI Act
timeline and the staged application dates are provided by the European
Commission and the Regulation text. COP29 finance goals are summarised by
UNFCCC. The WHO Pandemic Agreement adoption is confirmed by WHO and the WHA
resolution. (European Commission, 2024–2025; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; UNFCCC,
2024; World Health Organization, 2025a; World Health Assembly, 2025).
5 Aggregate Survival-Probability Calculation
1. Starting baseline survival = 100%
2. Subtract combined baseline risk (simple sum) = -101%
3. Add net mitigation effect = +31%
4. Revised survival probability (2026-2046) = 100% - 101% + 31% = 30%
CEN assigns an uncertainty band of 28-32 percent around the mid-range estimate to reflect parameter uncertainty and correlated-risk interactions (Appendix C).
6 Comparative Analysis: May 2025 → January 2026
Conflict risk broadening: The Benin crisis
and external involvement, coercive territorial rhetoric in the Arctic, and
Iran-linked escalation signals together indicate weakening restraint and higher
volatility across multiple theatres. CEN treats the January 2026 Iran
signalling and retaliation threats, alongside June 2025 combat and U.S.
strikes, as materially increasing the risk of a wider regional conflict and
associated cyber spillovers. (Reuters, 2025a-2025j; Reuters, 2026b-2026f; U.S.
Africa Command, 2025).
Europe–Russia posture: The Commission’s
defence-readiness proposals and UK preparations for potential post-ceasefire
deployment in Ukraine are interpreted as evidence that Europe expects a
prolonged period of confrontation risk with Russia, even if the policy framing
is defensive. (Reuters, 2025e; Reuters, 2026d).
Climate momentum: Record-high fossil CO2
emissions in 2024 and projected further increases in 2025 reinforce the
conclusion that incremental mitigation is not yet bending the global emissions
curve downward. (Global Carbon Project, 2024, 2025; IEA, 2025).
Governance positives: The WHO Pandemic
Agreement adoption and the staged entry into application of prohibited AI
practices under the EU AI Act represent concrete governance gains, but the net
effect is constrained by implementation timelines and uneven global coverage.
(World Health Organization, 2025; European Commission, 2024–2025).
7 Strategic Pathways to Tilt the Odds
·
Re-energise multilateral arms
control: restore and expand verification and risk-reduction channels, including
nuclear de-alerting and crisis hotlines, and integrate AI-enabled early-warning
safeguards.
·
Codify non-intervention and
sovereignty norms in the Americas: accelerate OAS- and UN-based diplomacy to
prevent a return to regime-change precedents that historically amplify long-run
conflict risk.
·
Build an Arctic
confidence-building package: strengthen transparency and incident-prevention
mechanisms among NATO states, Denmark/Greenland, and Russia to reduce
miscalculation risk in the High North.
·
Stabilise West Africa through
constitutional order and security-sector reform: prioritise ECOWAS and
AU-backed mediation, alongside professionalisation of military chains of
command and anti-corruption safeguards.
·
Operationalise the WHO Pandemic
Agreement: fund surveillance, surge manufacturing, and equitable countermeasure
access; make sequence-sharing and benefit-sharing mechanisms functional in
practice.
·
Move from pledges to
disbursement on climate finance: tie COP29 targets to enforceable investment
pipelines, with independent tracking and lower cost of capital for developing
countries.
·
Hard-code cyber and information
integrity: expand resilience standards for critical infrastructure and adopt
cross-platform transparency requirements to reduce AI-mediated manipulation.
8 Operational Roadmap (Indicative), 2026–2028
Table 3 provides an indicative operational
roadmap aligned with the strategic pathways above.
|
Period |
Milestone |
Lead actors |
|
Q1 2026 |
West Africa mediation taskforce
established for constitutional order and security-sector oversight |
ECOWAS, AU Peace and Security Council,
UNOWAS |
|
Q2 2026 |
Arctic incident-prevention working group
convened (maritime/air deconfliction, communication channels) |
Arctic Council members, NATO,
Denmark/Greenland authorities |
|
Q3 2026 |
WHO Pandemic Agreement implementation
facility capitalised (initial commitments and governance rules) |
WHO, CEPI, World Bank, regional
development banks |
|
Q4 2026 |
EU AI Act enforcement preparation package
for SMEs and public-sector deployers (literacy, procurement, conformity) |
European Commission, national competent
authorities |
|
H1 2027 |
COP29 finance tracking dashboard
operational with public reporting against the 2035 targets |
UNFCCC, MDBs, civil-society auditors |
|
H2 2027 |
P5+ risk-reduction talks reconvened with
AI and cyber incident clauses |
UNODA, Track-II networks, nuclear-armed
states |
|
2028 |
Global trust-and-information integrity
charter piloted in 10 countries |
UNESCO, media coalitions, civic-tech
consortia |
9 Conclusion and Call to Conscious Leadership
A mid-range 30 percent survival probability
is a stark indicator compared with earlier CEN estimates, yet it remains a
modifiable trajectory. The forces driving collective risk are human-made and
therefore human-modifiable. Conscious leadership requires practical prevention
of conflict, credible cyber and biosecurity controls, and the translation of
declarations of peace and responsibility into measurable action.
10 Appendices
Appendix A – Methodology (Summary)
1. Historical baselines: empirical distributions and reference datasets for conflict, disaster, and technology risk, including the Correlates of War datasets, SIPRI Yearbook materials, EM-DAT, WHO reporting, and NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office.
2. Expert-elicitation: structured elicitation and aggregation of subject-matter judgement to assign mid-point probabilities and confidence bands.
3. Trend capture: synthesis of peer-reviewed literature and authoritative policy reporting to determine directional adjustments to prior-year estimates.
Uncertainty bands are produced using a Monte Carlo simulation (triangular distributions centred on the mid-point, with 5,000 draws).
Table B1 provides CEN confidence bands (90%
interval) for baseline hazard likelihoods. Bands reflect judgemental
uncertainty.
|
Domain |
Likelihood (mid) |
90% interval |
Severity |
Contribution |
|
Major interstate war |
33% |
24-42% |
1.0 |
33% |
|
Nuclear weapon use |
11% |
6–16% |
1.0 |
11% |
|
Climate disruption |
29% |
23–35% |
1.0 |
29% |
|
Engineered pathogen |
13% |
8–20% |
1.0 |
13% |
|
AI-systemic cyber failure |
11% |
6-17% |
1.0 |
11% |
|
Space-asset cascade |
5% |
2–9% |
0.8 |
4% |
Table B2 lists key public datasets and
policy sources used to inform trend adjustments (not to compute the probability
values mechanically).
|
Domain |
Reference sources |
|
Conflict and nuclear posture |
SIPRI Yearbook 2025; Reuters reporting on
Ukraine-related defence policy |
|
Climate metrics |
Copernicus Climate Change Service; Global
Carbon Project; IEA Global Energy Review |
|
AI governance |
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; European
Commission AI Act timeline |
|
Pandemic governance |
WHO Pandemic Agreement press release;
WHA78 resolution |
|
Orbital debris |
NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO)
publications |
Appendix C – Risk-Weighting Formulae and Worked Example
• Existential threats (major war, nuclear use, engineered pathogen, large climate cascade) use multiplier w = 1.0.
• Systemic-disruption threats with higher recoverability (space debris) use w = 0.8.
Baseline risk ledger (simple sum):
Combined baseline risk = Σ (p_i × w_i)
where p_i is CEN-assigned 20-year likelihood and w_i is severity weight.
Mitigation ledger:
Net mitigation effect = Σ (positive levers) - Σ (negative offsets)
Survival probability (reported mid-point):
Survival = 1 - Combined baseline risk + Net mitigation effect
Worked example using 2026 mid-points:
Combined baseline risk = (0.33×1.0) + (0.11×1.0) + (0.29×1.0) + (0.13×1.0) + (0.11×1.0) + (0.05×0.8)
= 0.33 + 0.11 + 0.29 + 0.13 + 0.11 + 0.04
= 1.01 (101%)
Net mitigation effect = (0.23 + 0.12 + 0.09 + 0.14 + 0.10) - (0.20 + 0.17)
= 0.68 - 0.37
= 0.31 (31%)
Survival = 1 - 1.01 + 0.31 = 0.30 (30%).
These indicative budget ranges are
placeholders for programme scoping and are not commitments.
|
Initiative |
Indicative 3-year budget (range) |
Potential funding sources |
|
West Africa mediation and SSR support |
£150m–£300m |
ECOWAS, AU, UN trust funds, bilateral
donors |
|
Arctic incident-prevention package |
£80m–£150m |
Arctic Council member contributions |
|
Pandemic Agreement implementation
facility (seed funding) |
£2bn–£5bn |
WHO partners, MDBs, philanthropies |
|
EU AI Act enablement and compliance
support |
£200m–£400m |
EU budget
lines, national programmes |
|
COP29 finance tracking and
cost-of-capital reduction pilots |
£1bn–£3bn |
MDBs, climate funds, guarantees |
|
Trust and information integrity pilots |
£250m–£600m |
UNESCO partners, foundations, private
sector |
Appendix E – Verification Notes on Specific Claims
|
Claim |
Verification status and notes |
Primary sources |
|
France bombing Benin |
Not confirmed. Credible reporting
reviewed describes France providing intelligence/logistical support and
Nigeria conducting airstrikes. No authoritative evidence found that France
directly bombed Benin in the December 2025 events. |
Reuters, 2025a;
Reuters, 2025b; International Crisis Group, 2025; Le Monde, 2025. |
|
Nigeria invading Benin |
Partly confirmed with nuance. Reuters
reporting describes Nigeria conducting airstrikes and providing forces at
Benin’s request, rather than an uninvited invasion. |
Reuters, 2025a; Reuters, 2025b. |
|
U.S. bombing Muslim ‘terrorists’ in
Nigeria |
Confirmed in substance. U.S. Africa
Command and Reuters report U.S. airstrikes on ISWAP elements in north-west
Nigeria on 25 Dec 2025 at Nigeria’s request. |
U.S. Africa Command, 2025; Reuters,
2025c. |
|
U.S. kidnapping the President and his
wife of Venezuela |
Confirmed that Reuters reported U.S.
forces captured and transferred the Venezuelan President and his wife to the
United States; the characterisation as ‘kidnapping’ is a legal conclusion and
disputed. Reuters reported legal experts questioning legal basis. |
Reuters, 2026b. |
|
U.S. threatening to take over Greenland
using military forces |
Confirmed that Reuters reported President
Trump saying the U.S. ‘needs to own’ Greenland and describing internal
discussions that included potential military options. |
Reuters, 2026c. |
|
U.S. threatening to take action in Mexico |
Confirmed that Reuters reported President
Trump offering to send U.S. troops into Mexico and publicly suggesting
unilateral action against cartels. |
Reuters, 2025d. |
|
EU and UK military positioning toward Russia |
Value judgement. Verified facts include
policy moves to expand defence readiness and preparations related to Ukraine. |
Reuters, 2025e; Reuters, 2026d. |
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