Defensive Victimhood and the Legitimation of Revisionism by D. Conterno (2026)

 

Defensive Victimhood and the Legitimation of Revisionism: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Adolf Hitler’s Wilhelmshaven Speech (1 April 1939) and Its Contemporary Resonances by D. Conterno (2026)

Abstract

This short paper applies critical discourse analysis (CDA) to an English-language translation of Adolf Hitler’s public speech delivered at Wilhelmshaven on 1 April 1939. (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp) The analysis identifies recurring legitimation strategies:

a)      National “regeneration” narratives.

b)     Victimhood and betrayal framing.

c)      Moral-legal inversion (“vital right” over imposed law).

d)     Whataboutism via imperial comparisons (notably Palestine).

e)      Securitised pre-emption and historical entitlement (Lebensraum).

f)        Normalisation of rearmament and bloc formation.

Historically, several claims function as propaganda rationalisations in the context of Germany’s treaty revisionism and territorial expansion in 1938–1939; key assertions are contradicted by contemporaneous events (notably Germany’s occupation of Czech lands in March 1939 and invasion of Poland in September 1939), (https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/czechoslovakia). A brief comparative section identifies analogous rhetorical patterns in modern geopolitical discourse (encirclement/containment narratives; pre-emptive self-defence claims), while emphasising that rhetorical similarity is not moral equivalence.

Method (Critical Discourse Analysis)

Design. A qualitative CDA design was used to examine how language legitimises policy and constructs moral hierarchies. CDA was selected because it explicitly links textual choices (pronouns, modality, causal claims, moral evaluation) to political power and social practice (https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745612188).

Corpus. The primary text is the published English translation “Speech by Herr Hitler at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939 (Translation)” in The British War Blue Book, preserved by Yale Law School’s Avalon Project (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).  

(A separate Blue Book contents page also lists the speech as “April 1, 1939”. https://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-078.html).

Procedure. The speech was close-read and coded iteratively for

1.      Problem definition.

2.      Attribution of agency/blame.

3.      Legitimation strategies (moral evaluation, rationalisation, mythopoesis).

4.      Security framing and temporal sequencing (past humiliation → present strength → future necessity).

Themes were then checked against high-quality archival and academic sources for historical context (treaty texts; parliamentary records; reputable encyclopaedic scholarship; museum/archival history, https://mzv.gov.cz/file/198473/MunichAgreement.pdf).

Findings (Themes)

Theme 1: “Regeneration” as proof of legitimacy and capacity

The speech opens by using Wilhelmshaven as a metonym for national revival (“decline and regeneration”), positioning economic reconstruction as evidence of rightful political authority and national “determination”. This framing is not simply descriptive: it establishes a moral premise that material output and unity validate the regime, and it prepares the ground for later claims that strength is the “essential condition for life”(https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).

1930s pertinence. In 1939, this “revival” narrative functioned as regime legitimation at a moment when Britain had just issued a security assurance to Poland (31 March 1939), and Europe was reacting to Germany’s March 1939 seizure of Czech lands (https://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-078.html).

Theme 2: Victimhood, betrayal, and the “stab-in-the-back” ecosystem

The speech asserts Germany was “unbeaten” militarily in the First World War but “vanquished” by “falsehood” and propaganda (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp). This aligns with interwar narratives commonly referred to as the Dolchstoßlegende (stab-in-the-back myth), which framed defeat as the product of internal betrayal rather than military failure. High-quality academic reference works describe this as a politically potent postwar legend in Germany (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dolchstoss-im-Rucken).

Why it matters geopolitically. The move is strategic: if defeat was illegitimate, then the postwar settlement can be re-labelled as “dictate” and morally reversed (“crime is not justice”), enabling treaty revisionism to be narrated as rectification rather than aggression (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).

Theme 3: Moral-legal inversion (“vital rights” over “dictates”)

A central discursive pivot is the claim that “permanent vital rights of peoples come before” imposed agreements and that Providence created Germans to “stand up” for this “vital right” (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp). In CDA terms, this is de-legalisation (downgrading law as mere imposition) paired with re-moralisation (elevating national “life” as supreme).

Historical check. The speech explicitly calls for “smashing” the Versailles settlement (“so oder so!”, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp). In 1938–1939, German territorial actions were repeatedly framed as self-determination and necessity; however, Germany’s occupation of the remaining Czech lands in March 1939 occurred after the September 1938 Munich Agreement’s territorial settlement regarding Czechoslovakia, undermining the claim that changes were limited, stabilising, or purely defensive (https://mzv.gov.cz/file/198473/MunichAgreement.pdf).

Theme 4: Whataboutism and imperial comparison (Palestine as moral counter-accusation)

Hitler anticipates criticism by contrasting German claims with Britain’s imperial governance, including an explicit challenge: “what right has England to shoot down Arabs in Palestine” (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp). This is classic tu quoque: the legitimacy of criticism is attacked by alleging hypocrisy.

Contextual grounding. Britain’s authority in Palestine derived from an international mandate framework after the First World War (League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp). Credible historical reference material also documents large-scale unrest in 1936–1939 (the Arab Revolt) and Britain’s deployment of substantial forces (https://www.britannica.com/place/Palestine/The-Arab-Revolt). This does not validate Hitler’s broader moral conclusions; it demonstrates that the speech selects a salient imperial controversy to discredit critics and reframe Germany as comparatively “orderly” (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).

Theme 5: Securitised pre-emption and historical entitlement (Czech lands and “Lebensraum”)

The speech claims:

1. Czech authorities oppressed Germans.
2. Czechoslovakia was an “instrument” for attack on German industry.

Germany therefore acted “in good time” to neutralise a future threat, while also invoking a millennium of historical belonging (“Lebensraum”, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).

1939 pertinence and contradiction. Germany established the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia after occupying Czech lands on 15 March 1939 (https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/czechoslovakia). The speech’s “pre-emption” narrative thus functions as retrospective legitimation of an action already taken, re-described as a “service to peace” (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).

Theme 6: Strength doctrine, rearmament normalisation, and the “Naval Agreement”

A blunt ontological claim appears: “He who does not possess power loses the right to live”, followed by justification of rebuilding armed forces “on land… and in the air”. The speech also references the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as proof of Germany’s desire not to fight Britain, while warning that reciprocity is required (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).

Historical sequencing. In the same period, Britain publicly tied its policy to resisting threats to Polish independence (31 March 1939), reflecting the collapsing credibility of purely verbal assurances after March 1939 (https://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-078.html).

Theme 7: Bloc construction and ideological flattening (Axis; democracy = Bolshevism)

The speech validates the “Axis” with Italy and ridicules the possibility of cooperation between Britain and the USSR, claiming democracy and Bolshevism are effectively made of the “same substance”. This is discursively useful because it compresses ideological diversity among opponents into a single menacing outgroup, while presenting the fascist bloc as “natural” and value-based (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp). A primary archival text of the Germany–Italy alliance (Pact of Steel) from May 1939 evidences that this bloc-building was not merely rhetorical but institutionalised shortly afterwards (https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/nazi-germany-1933-1945/the-pact-of-steel-the-signing-of-the-german-italian-military-alliance-in-the-new-reich-chancellery-may-22-1939.pdf).

Theme 8: “Peace” claims in light of subsequent events

Repeated assurances that Germany does “not dream” of attacking others appear alongside warnings against “encirclement” and insistence on continued advance (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp). Historically, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, triggering the European war (https://www.britannica.com/event/Invasion-of-Poland?utm_source=chatgpt.com). As an empirical matter, this chronology sharply limits the credibility of the speech’s peace posture when treated as a guide to intent rather than propaganda.

Contemporary Resonances (Careful, Non-Equivalence Comparison)

This section does not equate today’s states or disputes with Nazi Germany. It identifies rhetorical patterns that recur in international politics.

1. Encirclement/containment narratives. The 1939 speech repeatedly frames Germany as threatened by “encirclement” and “intimidation” (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).
2. In modern official discourse, major powers also use “encirclement/containment” language. For example, NATO states that enlargement “is not directed against Russia” and frames alliance choice as a sovereign right (https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/wider-activities/natos-approach-to-counter-information-threats/setting-the-record-straight).
3. Russian official messaging, by contrast, has argued that NATO expansion and security dynamics justify exceptional measures (see the Kremlin’s published address of 24 February 2022, https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828). China’s foreign ministry has also publicly criticised what it describes as US “containment” and “suppression” policies in official press remarks (https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyjh/202405/t20240530_11341719.html).
4. Pre-emptive self-defence claims versus the post-1945 legal framework. Hitler’s speech elevates “vital right” above “dictates” and justifies preventive action to stop a future attack (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp). After 1945, the UN Charter codifies a general prohibition on the threat or use of force (Article 2(4)) and recognises self-defence if an armed attack occurs (Article 51, https://legal.un.org/repertory/art2.shtml). The International Court of Justice has treated Article 51 as operating against the background of an “inherent” right of self-defence, while still anchoring analysis in legal thresholds (https://www.icj-cij.org/case/70). The contemporary relevance is that leaders still attempt to linguistically convert contested uses of force into “defence”; the legal environment (and the scrutiny that comes with it) is materially different from 1939.

Limitations

1. Translation and transcript dependence. The analysis uses an English translation published in an official British collection; translation choices can affect nuance, modality, and rhetorical force (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).
2. Single-text inference limits. A single speech cannot, by itself, establish full policy intent, internal decision-making, or causal claims about international behaviour; it can show how a regime sought to justify actions publicly (https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745612188).
3. Historical verification boundaries. Some embedded claims (for example, specific allegations about planned air attacks) are presented as assertions within the speech; without a directly corroborating primary document in the provided source set, I treat them as rhetorical claims rather than verified facts ((https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp).

References

Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 18 June 1935. (1935). Treaty text (UK Treaty Series archival publication). https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/data/Library2/pdf/1935-TS0022.pdf

Britannica. (n.d.). Palestine: The Arab Revolt (1936–39). https://www.britannica.com/place/Palestine/The-Arab-Revolt

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Britannica. (n.d.). Spanish Civil War (Franco victory; 1939 context). https://www.britannica.com/event/Spanish-Civil-War

Chamberlain, N. (1939, March 31). Statement in the House of Commons announcing assurance given to Poland (British War Blue Book). https://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-078.html

Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. Polity Press. https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745612188

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Pact of Steel (Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy). (1939, May 22). Primary treaty text (archival document). https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/wider-activities/natos-approach-to-counter-information-threats/setting-the-record-straight

President of Russia. (2022, February 24). Address concerning the start of the “special military operation” (official transcript). https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828

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